|
No War, No Peace
Guest Writer:
Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor of the Colombo based Sunday Times and Daily Mirror
Sri Lanka has been fortunate to survive without war for the past three
years, and a sigh of relief passed across the country as it marked the third
anniversary of the ceasefire agreement signed between the Government and the
rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on February 22, 2002. Even
ardent opponents of the truce acknowledge that the ceasefire and the absence
of a full-scale conflict over the past three years has saved valuable lives
and property.
Behind this positive picture is a different and melancholy story - a story
of lost opportunities and lack of progress. Three years ago, there was
enthusiasm all round, with peace talks resuming in the Thai resort town of
Satahip. There was an economic boom riding on the expectation that the curse
of two decades was finally over. Three years later, there is no peace, no
war, and no talks. The only reality is the ceasefire agreement, which the
two parties continue to adhere to for strategic reasons, despite ceasefire
violations by both sides. Meanwhile, efforts to bring them together have not
ceased, with Norwegian peace facilitators making regular visits, shuttling
between Colombo and the LTTE base in Kilinochchi and also between Oslo and
London where the LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, is domiciled.
Norwegian Special Envoy, Erik Solheim, was in Sri Lanka last week in yet
another effort to bring the two sides face-to-face. This time, his effort
was aimed more at reaching an agreement on a joint mechanism to handle the
tsunami aid and relief work in the North and East, than the peace process
per se. But there was no breakthrough, and he had to leave empty-handed - a
situation, which the Norwegians have become accustomed to - after listening
to complaints from both sides.
Both the Government and the LTTE need the foreign funds to bolster their
respective positions. The LTTE also eyes a big share in the
multi-billion-dollar aid package, which the international community has
promised - though much of this aid remains only a distant promise. There
appears to be significant donor pressure on the Government to come to some
sort of a deal with the LTTE on the tsunami relief work before they release
any funds. Earlier the donors had linked the release of a 4.5 billion dollar
aid package to the resumption of the peace process.
A desperate Government, caught in a catch-22 situation, cannot accede to the
LTTE's demands without risking its narrow Parliamentary majority. On
Wednesday, February 23, 2005, the Government Information Department issued a
statement declaring that the Government was prepared to resume talks to set
up, first, an interim arrangement to handle the urgent humanitarian needs of
the people, and then to proceed to discuss the final solution to the
prolonged ethnic crisis. The remarks drew an angry response from the
coalition partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which threatened to
walk out of the Government if the talks on the interim authority took place
before a final solution to the ethnic conflict was found. The main
opposition United National Party (UNP) welcomed the Government's statement
and offered its unstinted support.
But just as Kumaratunga defied the JVP threat and agreed to go the extra
mile for the sake of peace, the LTTE appears to have toughened its stance
and escalated demands. The LTTE's position was that the talks should focus
only on its proposals for an interim self-governing authority for the North
and East. But in the aftermath of the killing of the LTTE's eastern leader,
E. Kaushalyan, on February 7, 2005, the rebels are now demanding that the
Government should dismantle all paramilitary groups - an obvious reference
to the breakaway Karuna faction. The LTTE accuses the Government of
complicity in the Kaushalyan killing and strongly believes that the military
is providing shelter to renegade LTTE cadres loyal to Karuna.
On February 14, 2005, Tiger ideologue Balasingham told Solheim at a meeting
in London that the Sri Lankan Government had to take steps to restore
confidence in the peace process, in particular by disarming paramilitaries
working alongside its armed forces, and to establish a joint mechanism with
the LTTE for post-tsunami aid. The two new demands have not only made the
Tiger's stance tougher but also made the Government's search for peace
difficult.
The President's response to Tiger allegations came in a statement on Friday,
February 25, 2005, which quoted Chandrika Kumaratunga as having told Solheim
that there were no paramilitaries working with the armed forces and
unreservedly condemned the killing of Kaushalyan. She also expressed her
Government's commitment to discuss "a working arrangement with the LTTE for
the equitable allocation and implementation of post-tsunami aid".
Whether the Tigers would accept her words or insist on action is yet to be
seen.
Against this backdrop, a political crisis is brewing inside the Government
with President Kumaratunga, who is on her last year in office, now
apparently regretting her alliance with the JVP. Two Sundays ago, addressing
a public gathering, she fired salvos at the JVP, accusing it of being an
obstacle to peace and asking it to leave the Government if it did not agree
with her policies.
If the JVP, which has 39 seats in the legislature, quits, her Government can
survive only if she gets the support of her main rival, the UNP. But, with
battle lines being drawn for a presidential race this or next year, the
UNP's cooperation will not be forthcoming or will be limited only to the
extent of securing political gains. Adding to the crisis, the Ceylon Workers
Congress, a party which derives its strength from the people of Indian
origin, has decided to withdraw its support to the Government. If the party
carries out its threat, the Government would once again lapse into a
minority, with the joint opposition calling the shots.
The Tigers will certainly be keeping close tabs on these political
developments, since southern politics is one of the factors that shape the
peace process. The Tigers may also cling on to the ceasefire till the
current political crisis has produced an outcome. The Tigers are also aware
that they can get foreign aid for development only if they keep away from
violence. They are, however, also aware that if the current situation of 'no
war, no peace,' continues it will make them politically and administratively
impotent and lead to the erosion of their support base. In the words of one
pro-Tiger analyst, a politically and administratively impotent LTTE that
cannot deliver anything socially or economically concrete to the Tamils
should, in theory, crumble inevitably if it is held for a sufficiently long
time in a no war no peace situation.
The LTTE is not unmindful of this stock counter insurgency wisdom.
At Kaushalyan's funeral, the LTTE said its patience was running thin and
warned the Government of a 'fitting response'. On Wednesday, February 23,
2005, LTTE cadres killed a soldier and wounded another in Killali in the
North. The LTTE did not mince words to claim the responsibility for the
incident. "Yes, we did it, so what" was its attitude.
In the three years of ceasefire, Wednesday's incident was just another
violation. When the Tigers are accused of ceasefire violations they respond
with ease by pointing to the Government's ceasefire violations, which are
largely unseen. They claim, for instance, that the Government has not
fulfilled its pledges to vacate all public buildings and homes in the North
East and to disarm paramilitaries. Besides, the LTTE claims that the
Government has also upset the military balance by buying arms from Iran and
Pakistan under multi-million dollar credit lines, adding that the flow of
tsunami aid has emboldened the Government to take this step.
On the other hand, the Government accuses the LTTE of covertly building up
its military machine even as the country was grappled with the tsunami
disaster. It is alleged that the Tigers have obtained military hardware
under the cover of tsunami relief. Tsunami aid cargoes destined for the LTTE
and detected at the airport have included two helicopters, ammunition and a
consignment of body armour.
The Government fears that the LTTE has grown from strength to strength
during the ceasefire. According to defence officials, it has not only
accrued air power, but also swelled its ranks with child soldiers. As of
February 2004, there were more than 1,250 child soldiers in LTTE camps, but
the real figure could be much higher, according to UNICEF. If a resolution
currently being discussed by the United Nations Security Council is adopted
next month, there would be targeted sanctions against Governments and rebel
leaders who continue to recruit child soldiers. The LTTE is likely to play
the peace card to circumvent international sanctions.
Thus the no-peace-no-war situation is expected to continue till the LTTE
finds the correct political and military coordinates to take its next step.
In Sri Lanka's conflict resolution exercise, it is the LTTE which still
calls the shots. |