India's Vietnam
Totally unprepared and
ill-equipped, that was the IPKF
Colonel John Taylor (retd), one of the first officers assigned to the IPKF,
says the army was made to fight with one hand tied behind its back.
By the time the Indian Peace Keeping Force was inducted after the India-Sri
Lanka Accord, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam had emerged a strong
militant group on the island. They had wiped out all opposition, both Tamil
and Sinhala. They had full control of the North and East. They were running
a parallel government. The administration and judiciary were with them.
The LTTE was both loved and feared by all. When I was in Sri Lanka, the only
Sinhalas north of the Elephant Pass were the Sri Lankan troops stationed
there. Only Tamils were safe in the area. Such was the total control of the
LTTE, because of their mass appeal.
When the Sri Lankan government reached its wit's end, it decided on military
action. It sent in its armed forces to sort out the LTTE. The first
full-scale military action, involving tanks, armoured personnel, carriers,
artillery and armed helicopters was launched in 1987. The ruthless manner in
which the Sri Lankan troops assaulted villages led the Tamils to cry
'genocide'.
Many critics have labelled the IPKF's role on the island as India's Vietnam.
The Sri Lankan Tamils, fed on LTTE propaganda, boasted of giving the fourth
largest army in the world, a bloody nose.
Nothing can be further from the truth.
The IPKF had successfully eliminated the middle order leadership of the LTTE
and broken their stronghold over the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE was forced
to take refuge in the jungles of the North and East. The Elephant Pass was
open for the first time after the LTTE had taken control of the Jaffna.
Movement of goods from the South, East and West was made possible after a
long period of time.
However, the IPKF operations were not a complete success. We were unable to
unite the different Tamil groups, mainly because of the intransigent
attitude of the LTTE. It wanted the whole pie or nothing.
Anyone with a military background will tell you that for an army to be
successful in an operation of the size and magnitude in Sri Lanka, it must
have excellent intelligence, freedom of action to plan and execute its
operations, and sound logistic support
Intelligence, or lack of it, has always been the bane of independent India.
Every military operation undertaken by us has been dogged by poor -- no,
pathetic -- intelligence. The Kargil Committee Report too has highlighted
this aspect.
We were aware of the LTTE's domination over other militant organisations,
but we were not aware of their innovative tactics, resourcefulness,
tremendous mass support and, most importantly, their excellent intelligence
network.
Let me give you two small examples of their subtle yet fatally successful
methods of passing on information. Whenever an army patrol left their camp
or post, the nearest temple or church would ring their bells to indicate how
many men were in the patrol. If the bell chimed six times the strength of
the patrol was six, and so on. Only later did we realise the truth of
Hemingway's classic For whom the Bells Toll: they were tolling for us.
Passing through a village or township, a small boy or girl would run ahead
to the end of the street, pass information about the patrol. The next
messenger would be cycle-borne. Thus the message went ahead -- messengers
changing every 150 metres or so. Even if they were intercepted, the boy or
girl only knew his portion of the route. No one person knew the ultimate
destination.
While passing messages on their radio sets, they switched frequencies
continuously. So the intercepts were just one line of a coded message. This
was something we were learning for the first time, and the hard way too.
The Research and Analysis Wing was in charge of collation of intelligence.
The less said about them the better. The intelligence agents were afraid for
their lives and hardly dared to venture out of their rooms. All the
information they passed on was acquired from the army. Things should have
been the other way round.
Unfortunately Rajiv Gandhi mainly accepted the advise given by RAW and other
intelligence agencies, and decided to induct the IPKF. What we heard on the
grapevine was that the RAW advisors had told the PM, "We will have
Prabhakaran in our custody within 72 hours." This was never confirmed, but
was an indicator of our poor intelligence assessment.
The entire IPKF operations were politically guided and intelligence
oriented. The armed forces had little or no say. Or else, a full-scale
military operation without the basic support arm, the artillery, would have
never been launched. Tanks and APCs were not used. There was no air cover.
Much later, an odd armed helicopter was brought in. For use against an enemy
which had taken refuge in the jungles. The only other operation conducted on
similar lines was when the Indian army was asked to flush out militants from
the Golden Temple: barefoot, with weapons slung over their shoulders.
To be able to send troops to a neighbouring country for policing or for a
military operation one has to have a strong and stable government, be at
least a mini superpower, be politically and economically strong, have a
strong army, air force and a navy with a medium strike radius (something on
the lines of the US Seventh Fleet), and be a nuclear power or at least have
some nuclear capability.
At that time we did not fulfill any of the above criteria. A strong and
capable government means having no internal threat and being able to
convince neighbouring countries of one's 'good intentions.' At the time of
the IPKF operations, we were the Big Bad Brother of the subcontinent. Even
Bhutan and Nepal had axes to grind with us.
Prior to the Accord, in the 1980s, the US-Israeli line favouring Colombo in
the conflict was a sore point with New Delhi because of our Tamil lobby. The
decision to intervene directly was based on wrong assumptions. We did not
have the wherewithal for such large-scale operations and we went in with a
token force which was totally unprepared for the job in hand.
It must go to the credit of the Indian armed forces, especially the air
force, for conducting one of the largest airlifts since World War II. Few
people are aware that in terms of man and material, more tonnage was lifted
by land and sea in Sri Lanka than in any theatre of operation during the
WWII. We were not organised for an operation of this nature. We did not have
any airborne divisions, nor did we have a Marine Corps; we had never
undertaken any amphibious operations. We just sent in an infantry division
which had none of those elements. Such was the IPKF, totally unprepared and
ill-equipped.
There were no proper maps. The IPKF did not even have sufficient cooking
utensils and radio sets. They were more ceremonial than tactical. Even the
chain of command was not adequately defined. The tactical HQ was initially
at Southern Command, Pune. Better sense prevailed later and a separate HQ
was set up for co-ordinating military operations of the IPKF at Madras.
After the assault on Jaffna the IPKF was also tasked to hold provisional
elections and other administrative duties like running essential services
and keeping the roads open. They manned banks, post offices, railways and
vehicular transport. These jobs were carried out with distinction by the
IPKF. This part of the story somehow never got publicity or praise. It was a
Herculean task, done with the typical thoroughness that is the hallmark of
our armed forces.
The army commanders were never given a free rein. It was always 'orders from
Delhi'. The intelligence agencies called the shots. Choice of weapons was
dictated from the top. This, in spite of the fact that the IPKF was fighting
a very cunning opponent, who had the full support of the local population
and who was operating in a terrain very well known to him.
The IPKF, on its part, had to fight in an alien country, alien terrain, face
a hostile population and deal with an unfavourable foreign government, who
never wanted it in their country in the first place.
India was no economic or military giant to undertake such an operation, but
then persons of importance thought otherwise. Militancy cannot be solved by
military action alone; more so in some other country. India should have
ensured a dialogue between the Tamils and Sinhalese. That may have been more
successful than sending in troops.
The revival of fresh initiatives for a new round of talks between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE has given rise to a sense of optimism.
The collapse of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the unsuccessful intervention
of the IPKF had led to a stalemate for more than 10 years. No substantial
efforts were made by a third party. The recent peace initiative made by
Norway is most welcome, and things appear to be a little more brighter as
there is now an international interest to end the Tamil-Sinhala stand-off,
which has wrecked the political security and economic stability of the
island.
A word of caution, however, needs to be added to this: similar attempts have
failed in the past. Especially the stand taken by the LTTE when Sri Lankan
President Chandrika Kumaratunga proposed peace initiatives. The Tigers have
since stepped up their offensive in the Jaffna peninsula.
For better leverage they will also step up their vicious policy of
elimination of other Tamil groups and leaders. This is their style, a
bloodbath before the calm of negotiations. Kumaratunga was lucky to survive
one such attempt, just a day prior to her re-election.
Though India is not interested in a direct involvement now, any negotiations
will have to take cognisance of her interests also. The 1997 Accord between
the People's Alliance government and the opposition United National Party on
the initiative of the British government fell through because New Delhi was
not consulted. Whoever negotiates a peace initiative will have to also
recognise India's geo-political concerns in the region and bring forward a
peace plan that would satisfy all.
The
intelligence agencies said, Don't worry about the LTTE, they are our boys,
they will not fight us
J N Dixit was India's high commissioner to Sri Lanka from 1985 to 1989. He
played a major role in drafting the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987, and the
subsequent induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force to implement it.
Days after Indian troops arrived on the island, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam started what it was best at: guerrilla attacks in the jungles
and shanty towns of north-east Lanka. It killed over 1,200 soldiers, maimed
thousands, and forced the IPKF to abandon its task and retreat.
As then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi government's key man in Sri Lanka, Dixit
was in the hot seat and privy to all the greenroom drama. Giving a clean
chit to Gandhi, he blames the heavy casualties India suffered in the initial
fighting for Jaffna on Major General Harkirat Singh, the IPKF's first
commander.
Dixit spoke to Josy Joseph last fortnight:
It is 10 years since the IPKF withdrew. Was it rightly timed?
My view would be prejudiced. I think the Indian forces went to ensure the
implementation of the agreement of July 1987, not to fight the Tamils or the
Sinhalese. It was the LTTE that primarily created a situation that resulted
in the Indian army having to fight them. And also, the Sri Lankan government
ministers like Lalith Athulathamuthali and Premadasa, who sabotaged the
agreement.
Despite these limitations, the Indian army did a very effective job of
restoring stability, organising a democratic government in the north-eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka. In my judgment, we withdrew in haste. Had we stayed
on perhaps for eight months or a year, we could have perhaps stabilised the
situation and generated sufficient persuasion on [LTTE chief Velupillai]
Prabhakaran to come back to the political path.
We withdrew because the V P Singh government and then foreign minister Mr
Gujral partially felt that they need to be legalistically correct: we were
in a foreign country, the president of that country says "go away", and you
come back.
The second thing is, there was a political motivation to prove Rajiv Gandhi
was not right. But have the last 10 years shown the Sri Lankans got a better
deal? Have the Tamils got anything better compared to what was provided for
in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement? And most of it was implemented under the
amendment of the 13th Sri Lankan government.
In fact, our troop-withdrawal resulted in erosion of the things which were
beneficial to the Tamils. Sri Lanka sunk back into 10 years of violence. It
sees no end even today. My view may be considered partisan because I was
involved in the process as the high commissioner. Remarkable proof of it is:
Renil Wickramasinghe, the present leader of the Opposition, has gone twice
on record, once sometime in 1995 or 1996, and he told this to [then Indian
prime minister P V] Narasimha Rao that he would like the Indian troops to
come back.
The second thing, more than one Sri Lankan, Sinhalese and Tamil politician
have acknowledged that the proposals in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement were
the best compromise possible. They have become irrelevant because so much of
violence occurred. New political terms have emerged.
On what basis do you say that had the IPKF stayed for a little more time it
would have completed its mission?
Jaffna was pacified that it was under a civilian government. Trincomalee was
pacified. Baticaloa and Ampare were pacified. LTTE cadres were pushed out of
north-central Sri Lanka. They were all concentrated in a small place north
of Vevunia jungles. Had we continued our military containment operation we
could have persuaded them to surrender and give up violence.
More important than the withdrawal is the induction. Was it the right
decision to send in the IPKF?
We didn't want to send troops, who said that? Sending the troops was not
part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Please understand. There was no
thinking on the part of India to send armed forces into Sri Lanka during the
negotiations and till the morning of the signing of the agreement on July
27. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Janatha Vimukti Peramuna organised
wide-scale riots all over Colombo, it spread to the whole of Sinhalese areas
in Sri Lanka in the morning a day before. On the morning the agreement was
signed it became so violent that they went and burnt down the president's
house somewhere south of Colombo.
President Jayewardane wanted to withdraw his troops from Jaffna to control
the riots in the South. And it was he who said, "I want some Indian troops
to come in to ensure security in Jaffna and Trincomalee because I am
withdrawing my Sinhalese troops to maintain law and order here."
And Mr Rajiv Gandhi -- I was present -- said, Are you sure you want our
troops? Because India can be criticised, Sri Lanka can be criticised. He
said, I am going to give you a formal written invitation. Mr Gandhi said,
Let us first sign the agreement, and then in your letter, if you think it is
necessary, you say to ensure the efficient implementation of the agreement
you want the troops. So it was a separate matter.
Did Gandhi's agreement to send in the troops surprise you?
No. It didn't. He was reluctant. Why should it surprise you? We had
anticipated this possibility, so we had no qualms. 20, 30 days before, all
sorts of contingencies were speculated upon by the army chief, intelligence,
ministry of external affairs. There was no surprise.
This was one of the contingencies that you foresaw?
Yeah.
Did you expect them to fight?
No. How can you expect? But we had speculated on the possibility. I have
said that in my book.
In your book you also admit to the fact that India sent in troops with
inadequate briefing.
Yes, the army did not brief its own people why they were going in. But that
is the armed force's responsibility. I had specifically asked [then army
chief Krishnaswamy) Sunderji in the presence of Rajiv Gandhi, suppose you
face a situation where you have to fight the LTTE, what will you do? He
said, no, it will take a fortnight to take care of them. And the chief of
intelligence said, These are our boys, once they have agreed they will not
betray. Anand Verma said this to Rajiv Gandhi.
You think that was bad judgment?
Why blame one or the other? All of us who were involved are to be blamed.
There was a certain... why certain, there was a very basic lack of judgment
about what Prabhakaran's intentions were. There is a whole chapter in my
book on how we failed. Read it. The whole chapter, totally uninhibited
acknowledgement of where all we went wrong.
Did we underestimate the capabilities of the LTTE?
Yes. Perhaps we did. We did.
Intelligence agencies, did they come up with inputs?
Intelligence agencies did not analyse it from that point of view at all.
They said these are boys who were trained by us from 1977 or whatever.
The LTTE?
All of them. Why the LTTE? All the 50 different groups. LTTE , EPRLF [Eelam
People's Revolutionary Liberation Front], all sorts. They did not look at it
from that angle at all. They said these are our boys, we know them very
well, they owe so much to us, so once they say yes, they will not fight us,
they won't. That was their judgment.
More than a former foreign secretary you are an analyst of diplomacy and
international affairs today. Was India's decision to train them wrong?
See, you do not indulge in value judgement, in retrospect, in hindsight. It
is unrealistic. When you take a decision, you are in the middle of a
situation. Nobody sitting in a chair 10 years later, five years later, is
competent to judge whether it was necessary or not. Whether it was necessary
or not was decided upon by the then government, then prime minister, on the
basis of information and analysis that were available.
The army went in in 87. Between 77 and 85, [Indian prime minister] Mrs
Gandhi would have been given information about all sorts of security
equations, intelligence equations, that Jayewardane was developing with
Pakistan, with Israel, with the Americans. Mind you, the Cold War had not
ended. Plus, the compulsion of Mrs Gandhi was not only external, you have 60
million Tamils in your country. It is one of the most important states in
our republic, and which has a history of secessionism. In 67 they threatened
to separate on the question of language.
So she had take care of the sentiments of 60 million people who send out
messages to her. In fact they went to the extent of saying that, Achcha,
when the Bengalis were in trouble you gave support. When the Tamils are in
trouble, because we are from the South, you are not giving us support. It is
all easy to sit on moral judgment and say, No, no, we should not have done
it, we should not have interfered, non-alignment, Mahatma Gandhi's country
etc. The political pressures of that particular point of time must have made
the then government consider it necessary. It is a different matter that it
did not come through as we desired.
It did not come through as we desired because we did not have the grit to
follow through a policy decision which we took. You have to look at it in
two contexts: Either you are a totally committed moral country. In that
case, you should have said that it is a problem of another country, it is an
internal problem, do sort it out [yourself]. And to the extent possible, we
will receive the refugees. Then you are safe and nice.
Or, because of consideration of our politics, and our internal political
pressures, external consequences, we have taken an initiative that is
strictly not moral. In that case, we should finish the task that has been
undertaken. If you leave it half way, then you have the perceived lack of
judgment, lack of performance. This is what has happened. You think we did
not take the position regarding Bangladesh, there also we interfered many
times. What happened in the Maldives, where we finished the operation in
two-and-a-half days and came back?
If you look at the newspapers of the first two-and-a-half months, from July
to October, the Indian papers were full of praise. Even the Americans came
and told the Government of India that you assume responsibilities which are
yours, we are glad. The moment you do not do it fully, everybody will say
that you are no good.
Did the V P Singh government consult you while withdrawing troops?
They didn't consult any one of us. They had a two-point programme. We must
be given a certificate for being a very good non-aligned, great
non-interfering country. And second, we must do things exactly opposite to
what Rajiv Gandhi did.
Did you feel bad that an expert hand on Lanka like you was ignored?
Why should I feel bad? I am a professional. Why should I feel bad? I was not
even dealing with Sri Lanka then. I was the high commissioner in Pakistan.
You do a job to the best of your ability in a particular assignment and when
you move away from it somebody will continue. In my profession, there is no
place for emotions. The only thing emotional about my profession is
hopefully a very deep commitment to India. That is the only thing. In my
judgment, the IPKF going in was in India's interest.
But once the IPKF entered we suffered humiliating casualties.
That was the foolishness of [IPKF's first commander, Major General] Harkirat
Singh. You don't do a helicopter attack in full moonlight after giving
advance notice to the enemy.
Was the army aware that the LTTE could intercept its messages?
Of course they were. [But] He [Major General Harkirat Singh] was a most
inept general. The first general there was the most inept fellow.
Do you think the death of over 600 soldiers in a most gruesome manner during
the initial fighting for Jaffna could have been avoided?
Much of it could have been avoided.
Did Major General Harkirat Singh come down to you for any briefings,
discussions?
Once in August, and once perhaps in September with General Sunderji. No, not
Sunderji, Mr K C Pant. He never came otherwise. In fact, he was so wooden
that when those fellows where arrested and brought to the Palami airbase, I
told them to take them into protective custody and not let the Sri Lankan
authorities get to the LTTE cadre.
The fellow said, No, no you are not in my chain of command. Please don't
tell me. You first send it to the ministry of external affairs, they should
send it to the ministry of defence, they should send it to army
headquarters, they should send it to Southern Command. Then Southern Command
should tell Madras. Then they should tell me, then only I will act. I said,
By then the game will be over. I am telling you I am fully responsible. No,
I will not do it, he said. The result was that the 17 fellows were killed.
That added to the LTTE anger?
That is the origin of where we had to fight the LTTE. The LTTE got an
excuse. [Thanks to] this man's foolishness.
Sri Lanka continues as a united country
because of Rajiv Gandhi
The general's "foolishness" cost us most of the lives?
Yes.
Did you write to the government about the lack of planning?
I don't know. I don't remember. I must have send telegrams and reports.
Did you feel bad about the initial casualty?
Naturally. If your soldiers are killed, you feel bad. But I didn't know the
background, why they were killed. General Sunderji and Harkirat Singh did
not consult me when to attack and how to attack. These are operational
matters. I was not involved.
There were differences between the Indian diplomatic mission in Lanka and
IPKF, is that it?
On political matters there were no differences. Except Harkirat Singh in one
case, in the beginning. Regarding that 17 people.
Your foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari reportedly did not possess a deep
knowledge of the Tamil problem. He asked you to hand over a letter to a dead
Tamil leader. In Thimpu, his rhetoric apparently forced LTTE to walk out of
negotiations.
He called the Tamils fools. Apparently he said, What is all these
foolishness? Then he said, Are we bloody fools?
He was not aware of the problems?
No. A shallow human being (laughs).
Did all that contribute to the ultimate failure?
No. I think the situation was retrieved after he went away. [A P]
Venkateswaran and K P S [Menon] were good.
After the failure of the two rounds of talks in Bhutan, did the Indian
foreign office tighten its approach towards Tamil leaders?
I don't think we tightened our stand against Tamils, until 1986 end.
But you refused a visa to some leaders.
Naturally, we refused a visa for arms to come in. Because we had changed our
policy, Rajiv Gandhi had changed the policy of supporting violent militants.
That is what was the hardening of attitude towards Tamils. If you are
mediating, then I don't want you go create violence. Mrs Gandhi was not
mediating. Please remember, there is a difference between Mrs Gandhi's
approach and Rajiv Gandhi's approach. Mrs Gandhi was not mediating; she was
generating pressure and was siding with the Tamils. Up to a point where she
thought Jayewardane would compromise.
Rajiv Gandhi changed it and said, I want to be a honest mediator. Therefore,
to gain credibility in view, I will stop giving support to militant
activities. So if planeloads of arms and other things land for distribution
to Tamil militants, we did not allow it. These are the people who are doing
militant activity. But we have always been in close or continuous touch with
all militant groups since at the Bangalore summit in 1986 Prabhakaran said,
No, I am not agreeing to anything. He was brought to Bangalore and talked to
Rajiv Gandhi.
The replacement of G Parthasarathy as the key negotiator, his replacement by
Bhandari and others. Did it have any impact?
Naturally. Bhandari did not have the knowledge or emotional understanding of
the problem. He was in a hurry to prove that he was a great peacemaker.
Parthasarathy was a very mature person, with deep knowledge. A great figure.
Young people don't like old people. So Rajiv Gandhi said, Who is this
78-year-old man?
You met Prabhakaran four or five times. What was your personal impression?
How did you converse with him? In Tamil?
Little bit of Tamil. But mostly in English. I understand Tamil, but I can
barely carry on a conversation in Tamil. My late wife was a Tamil lady. The
impression I got was of a very, very determined young man, with a lot of
fire and emotional and other commitment to the cause. The man was very
conscious of his personal security. In hindsight, I can say the man was a
very good political tactician.
Was he courteous?
Oh yes.
Was he always serious? Or had a sense of humour?
No. Very serious with me. He was very upset with me. He said he will only
come for the Jaffna negotiations after the agreement was signed only if the
foreign secretary came, or somebody from Delhi should come. Then only he
could make it. When I was told I should talk with him, I told the Government
of India, I don't want to go. Why should I go? If he wants to talk to
somebody in Delhi, let him. Let somebody from Delhi come.
But then the government said I should go. Then when the message went that he
has to talk to me, he said I should first arrive in Jaffna. Then he will
come from wherever he was hiding. I sent a clear message to him, Unless I
get confirmation that you are in the military camp sitting with Harkirat
Singh I am not coming. Fellow came and sat.
Among the Tamil leaders, was there a second figure other than Prabhakaran
who could have influenced the course of history?
Not in that generation. There were others. Vardaraja Perumal, Padmanabha,
several young people. But this chap [Prabhakaran] was way ahead of them in
terms of commitment and capacity. And after we stopped supporting him, he
had money coming in from other sources. He had diversified his training
facility with the PLO, and also with the Mossad. Very funny. Mossad was
simultaneously training the Sinhalese and the LTTE.
And, he had a lot of money from Tamil expatriates. They have a vested
interest, because as long as the conflict continues, they can have the
refugee status abroad, get a lot of money.
Among Lankan politicians who was the most impressive? How do you rate
Chandrika Kumaratunga?
She was perhaps the most thoughtful and practical leader. Jayewardane agreed
under compulsion. Gamini Dissanayake [who drafted the agreement along with
Dixit], who was killed, was also somewhat like Chandrika. Others were all
trying to be clever.
How do you look at the present situation?
I don't see any breakthrough. They will go on suffering violence till they
get exhausted or till they get destroyed. Norway or no Norway (laughs), I
don't know.
Should India think of interfering again?
(Waves his hands in disapproval).
Not again?
As far as I am concerned, first of all it was not interference. We were
trying to help. Except in the beginning stages, when Mrs Gandhi did
interfere.
So India should not think of again burning its fingers?
Each human being is subject to his own experiences, consciousness,
inadequacies. Having gone through that, I would never again want to
interfere in anybody's matters. Not because such interference become
necessary, but I don't think as a State we have either the necessary
political will or the inner grit. If you don't have it, why get into all
that?
Any particular instance, during those years, that you think should have been
differently handled?
It is an irrelevant question. I never discuss what might have been, because
we did what we did subject to the pressures and circumstances of that time.
And I think negotiating that agreement and the content of that agreement was
the best deal that the Tamils could get under a united and unbroken Sri
Lanka. The other solution is to break away Jaffna. They won't get
Trincomalee and Baticaloa because Muslim-speaking Tamils were no more
sympathetic to the LTTE. They never felt close to any Tamil Hindu group. So
all that they will get is Jaffna. What will they do with Jaffna? It is a
small part of what they call the Tamil homeland.
How was your overall tenure in Lanka?
It was very interesting, but very tense. I cannot recollect how many
political murders I witnessed.
Were you satisfied with your performance as the ambassador there?
I did everything in the context of what I consider was my country's
interests. The rest is for history and others to decide. Whatever the
government decided that time, in my judgement, was in the interest of the
country and the interest of Sri Lanka. If Sri Lanka continues today as a
united country it is because of that accord and because of Rajiv Gandhi.
Rajiv Gandhi always listened to you?
Yes. Yes, he did.
People criticise him as an immature politician who mixed up things.
It was also said of Mrs Gandhi when she took over power. You see, all these
judgements are judgments of hindsight. If he had succeeded nobody would have
said he was immature and young (laughs).
Five or six years later, people are sitting around making value judgements.
He did the best thing. He had charisma; he captured the imagination of the
Indian people at least for 2, 3 years. In the past 50 years, he was the
first prime minister who was young, who asked us to go forward instead of
talking about the past. He took some wrong decisions, wrongly advised and he
was assassinated.
His murder, how did it impact you?
I told you, in my professional life, I have no emotions. Of course, one felt
sad that the prime minister whom one knew personally was murdered by the
LTTE. His mother too had a violent death.
You expected such violent attacks from the LTTE?
From the beginning itself. The moment IPKF started cracking down on the
LTTE, it was logical to assume that LTTE would target people.
Were you aware that intelligence agencies continued to train LTTE even after
the IPKF landed in Lanka?
Yes. The IPKF fought LTTE cadres, who came to Madras and got treated at
hospitals and went back to fight them. Also perhaps, the LTTE's base in
Tamil Nadu continued to facilitate the flow of arms and money to them. They
enjoyed financial and political patronage.
Of which parties?
All sorts of people. There was this Maran [not Murasoli Maran], V
Gopalaswamy. Several of them including George Fernandes.
Isn't it then amazing that Fernandes is India's defence minister now?
That is the miracle of India (laughs).
You were aware that all these people were openly supporting LTTE even after
the IPKF landed there?
Yes.
So what did you feel about their involvement?
I can only say what I did. I do not know what the decision at the highest
level of government was.
How active was Fernandes at that time?
He was not very active that time.
Did he visit Lanka during that period?
No.
He was visiting LTTE leaders in Delhi?
I have no idea. He must have had contacts. Subramanian Swamy has contacts.
Are you planning to write anything more on your Sri Lankan experience?
No. Enough is enough.
The day
the elected government was in place, the military role of the IPKF was over
From January 1988 till New Delhi withdrew its troops from Sri Lanka,
Lieutenant General A S Kalkat was the man in charge of the Indian
operations.
Ten years down the line, he is still evasive when you ask him who is to
blame for rushing in soldiers to the island nation without proper briefing,
inadequate logistics and misplaced intelligence inputs. And he feels the
Indian Peace Keeping Force completed most of its task.
Lt Gen Kalkat, however, admits that it indeed was an ill-equipped and
unprepared army that he was put in charge of. He answered Josy Joseph's
queries:
General, do you think the withdrawal was well-timed? Had the IPKF completed
it task?
The IPKF went there as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord signed in 1987. Our
role was to assist the democratic implementation of the Accord and prepare
the ground for that. And the test of that was to create conditions such that
an election could be held in the north and the east. In October-November of
1988, elections were held. Basically about a year after the Accord, the
conditions were created for the elections.
The second part of the agreement was that the Sri Lankan government would
fulfill its obligations under the Accord. Primarily, devolution of power.
And certain safeguards. In lieu of that the Tamils and LTTE, which was the
most militant party, would give up arms. That was part of the agreement
itself. That after the conditions were created for democratic process to go
through, elections will be held. Tamils would vote.
That was done, and elections were held. If you recall, it was the highest
ever turnout in the Sri Lankan history. It was over 60 per cent. That was
pretty good for any election anywhere, even in our own country.
And the Tamil party, the EPRLF, won. The LTTE boycotted the election. The
other parties also participated. The Sri Lankan parties, the Sinhala
parties, too. The Sri Lanka Muslim Party also participated. With the result
that an election could be held and we could have the provisional assembly.
The next part after that had to be the proclamation by the [Sri Lankan]
president to merge the two provinces because the demand was for a single
homeland, not a divided homeland.
And it did not happen soon.
It took a lot of prodding, pressurising by us. But since the IPKF was on the
ground, one was able to get them to do it. The moment the decision took
place, the northern and eastern provinces stood merged. And that is
something which is even now forgotten: that the north and eastern provinces
stood merged. It became the North-Eastern Provincial Council.
The moment it became so, they elected a chief minister, the leader of the
party Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, Varadaraja Perumal. Now
that was all right. Then the most important thing to define was his rights
to function as the provincial government, and that is where the role of the
Sri Lankan government, bureaucracy and political hierarchy come into it.
They were holding on to it, hedging on it. The day the militancy was put
under control and elections were held and the elected government was in
place, the military role of the IPKF was over. A military man thereafter had
no role.
But you stayed on.
Because of the peculiar conditions of the north-eastern government. The
police force was non-existent [there]. Actually, the police force had
disintegrated. The reason is also obvious: the police primarily consisted of
Sinhalese. The area was predominantly Tamil -- in fact the northern part was
90 per cent Tamil. And the eastern part was 33 per cent Tamil. It was 1/3
Tamil, 1/3 Sinhala, 1/3 Muslims. Muslims speak Tamil, but they do not
identify themselves as Tamils.
So there were no Tamils and it would have then been not practical to have a
police force entirely manned by Sinhalese. A police force had to be created;
it was created. And certain notification had to be done. All these things
took time. So we were assisting to that extent.
The police force became fairly functional, but unfortunately the powers of
the North-Eastern Provincial Government were not devolved upon this
government. So, the police force took orders from Colombo. The chief
minister had no power even on one simple constable in the entire
north-eastern province. So his credibility was getting questioned. He had no
financial powers, in fact not even the powers of a municipal corporator.
Because all the powers came under the centre, that is part of the devolution
that had to take place.
After that it had to be promulgated. It is something like in Delhi you have
the Rent Control Act passed; the government hasn't yet notified the act for
implementation. Similar thing they were doing there. And it was a very
deliberate pattern there in Colombo because they wanted to go back on some
ingredients of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. We could not have gone back on it,
because we had committed ourselves and we were there, and India was
committed to the rights of the Tamils. But Premadasa had no intention of
doing so. When he found that a government [in India] which had come on a
platform that it would withdraw [the IPKF], all that he had to do was to
carry on delaying it till we withdrew.
Once we had withdrawn then it was a different story because as you are
aware, before we withdrew, Premadasa announced that he had opened talks with
the LTTE and they have become the best of friends and that they will never
fight again. And they have withdrawn all defensive postures and therefore
the IPKF, the third party, was not required and it should go home.
The most
difficult part was managing the withdrawal
So that was the game plan of the LTTE and Premadasa?
This was part of the same game plan. The two of them decided that if IPKF
remained there, then neither could cheat the other on the Accord. And each
one thought that he was cleverer than the other. So both were playing a game
to double-cross each other. Who could prevent them from doing it was the
IPKF. Our stand was it was not over and if they do it, they will end up
killing each other. That is the reason why the IPKF remained there. Because
we were sure that it would not work. And it was apparent that both sides
would not do what they were saying. Their priority was, Let us get the IPKF
out.
For the LTTE their concern was that as long as the IPKF was there they could
never get away with their demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. For the Sri
Lankan government, or the Sinhala government of Premadasa, it was quite
clear that we could insist that the Sri Lankan government honour its part of
the agreement.
You had a lot left to be done.
There were so many things to be done. The land reforms. There were illegally
occupied land, they had many areas where the demographic pattern had been
changed. In the northern province certain area was made a separate territory
for the so-called experiments in irrigation, but basically the Sinhala
convicts were resettled there. It was a convict's colony. They were trying
some arid agricultural experiments etc. Those land belonged to the Tamils,
it was part of the Tamil homeland. There were many issues like that.
But Premadasa pushed you out.
Both felt that it was not in their interest to honour the Accord.
Particularly after Jayewardane stepped down and Premadasa took over. He had
always opposed the agreement. In that he was backed by a large chauvinistic
group of Sinhalese. So both of them felt that let us get the IPKF out, then
we will sort the other guy. So the IPKF came out on March 24, 1990.
When did you get orders to leave Lanka?
I was told that our government gave a commitment that by the 31st of March
the IPKF would withdraw. So I was given the charter. By that time it was
apparent that the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government had joined hands. When
I say the Sri Lankan government -- I would like to clarify that not all
governments have been like that -- I mean Premadasa's government and not of
his predecessor or his successors.
You came across proof of the LTTE-Sri Lankan government collaboration?
The collaboration between the LTTE and the government had started around
October 1989. It came to our notice, and we brought it to the notice of the
Sri Lankan government and our government also. I myself took it up at the
highest level, with the President.
But the Lankan government never accepted that?
Of course, it was denied. There was nothing that they could do. I am
literally accusing them of collaborating with or sleeping with the enemy.
The whole scenario changed soon after President Jayewardane decided that he
will not stand for elections. The presidential election was held around, I
think, December 1988, and as soon as President Jayewardane decided that and
nominated Premadasa to be his successor, the bureaucracy and government
started naturally behaving in the interest of Premadasa. So he started
working on it earlier, and as soon as the announcement came the tilt was
slowly and slowly taking place.
You interacted with the Sri Lankan army closely. How did they react to
Premadasa's decision to tie up with the LTTE? Did the army also change its
tunes to suit the new president?
Obviously, the last organisation to be affected by the tilt was the Sri
Lankan army. They were professionals, they were dedicated. But over a period
of time that also gets affected when the government gives you certain
orders. Slowly and slowly they started replacing those officers who would
not play ball with Premadasa. Because it was hurting them also, because the
Sri Lankan army had been fighting the LTTE. They had lost a lot of people.
And then suddenly to ask them to collaborate with them and assist them
wouldn't go well. In fact, to the extent that Mr Premadasa faced a revolt
within the army at that time.
You could feel that revolt?
I could feel that revolt simmering. And there was talk in Colombo that they
might press a coup. The [ Sri Lankan] army chief that time was Hamilton
Vanasinghe. But it was not one person, it was simmering across the board
with generals because they were not happy. Because on the one hand they were
asked to go easy on the LTTE, and on the other hand they had been asked to
give them weapons.
A lot of officers would say We are giving them weapons today, and they will
be used against us one day. So he was in a precarious situation. I think for
him getting past it, he owes it to his late foreign minister who was
assassinated, Ranjan Wijayarante. He was also the minister for defence,
because he was liked by the army and he supported their action. What he did
was since he could not go in any way against his president on the IPKF
issue, he got clearance from the president for the Sri Lankan army to go
against the JVP.
They were facing two problems. The JVP, the leftist Marxist movement in the
South, and the LTTE in the North. Therefore, he got the clearance that the
army would have a free hand against the JVP. And as you know, within three
months they had virtually destroyed the JVP. They just destroyed it. Of
course there were no human right activists there that time, otherwise it is
a matter that would have come up. Those times, the visual media wasn't like
it is today, so a lot of it did not come out. Today, there is a lot of
transparency in military operations; at that time it was by and large close.
With that the army, and every one got a respite.
You haven't answered my question: Was it the right time for the IPKF to
withdraw?
It was preordained. There was no option. It had been announced by the new
government in India in 1989. Once it was elected, the IPKF had to withdraw.
We were told the time.
Once the withdrawal was announced, what were your concerns?
The main thing I was concerned about was that the Sri Lankan government was
hostile to us to the extent possible. Not that they were fighting us, but
they were abetting the fighting. I did not want my soldiers to be caught
like what happened in Vietnam or in Afghanistan. I wanted to make sure that
every soldier came home safely. I did not want to lose lives during the
withdrawal.
Secondly, I wanted the withdrawal to be with dignity, not as in Vietnam
where people were running away, hanging on to helicopters. Those thing would
be terrible for the morale of an army. I was quite determined that as we
went in with our flag flying high, we would come out with our heads high. So
certain plans had to be put into action.
The most difficult part of my entire command was managing the withdrawal of
the IPKF. At one stage we had 70,000 troops, we slowly brought them down to
50, 40, and then to 30,000. When you are in a narrow bridge head, with the
LTTE all around and you getting militarily no assistance from the Sri Lankan
army and the LTTE free at that stage, the prime concern for me was the lives
of my soldiers.
Every day we withdrew certain amount with ships at Trincomalee and
Konkeshanthurai in the northern province of Jaffna. We had planned the
de-induction. Each day a battalion would withdraw; over three days that
would complete a brigade and that was how it was done.
The last day a ceremonial send-off was given by the Sri Lankan army. Guard
of honour was given at Trincomalee. The foreign minister came there, then
the three service chiefs of the Sri Lankan armed forces, senior officers of
the armed forces and, of course, the media was there to see. While we were
pulling back, we had our party standing by on all sides to make sure that
someone did not double-cross or conspire against our soldiers. We had even
helicopters on board standing by to extricate.
We did not want to leave behind a single item of equipment because it was
costly and they were heavy equipment which had to be phased out. We had
heavy vehicles, tanks, armoured cars, which was useful. Now, we needed them
there, we wanted to keep them till the last, but then to keep them till the
last and pulling them out on a ship takes hours. So you had to have a fine
balance, take them as late as possible but not too late.
And ultimately, of course, the infantry solider was on his own. For these
kind of problem one did make arrangements for some kind of naval guns to
support, if we can call. These kind of management, tactical planning was
done.
Did any trouble happen during the withdrawal?
No. If anything, we were over careful, and things went off as we planned.
While withdrawing did you not think that you could have brought complete
peace, disarmed the LTTE?
There are a couple of things. Disarming the group cannot be an ongoing task.
You can disarm a group, there are no arms today. But you cannot guarantee
that they will not acquire them in future. So it cannot be a job in
perpetuity. It should be time-framed. The military part is disarming, the
LTTE was disarmed to that extent, their holding became negligible once we
were able to hold elections. But then they continued to get arms. That is
why they went to the Sri Lankan government and got arms.
Now, that task cannot be given to the military, to prevent the government
from arming them. Because the implications of that are far serious. To
prevent that I have to go at the personnel arming them, I cannot go at the
Sri Lankan government.
The second part is, what about peace? Can you bring in peace? Let me say
this: Application of military force will never bring peace, anywhere in the
world. I know I am making a categorical statement, but I stand by that
statement. Application of military force can never bring about peace. Peace
in the minds of the civil population is the perception in the minds of the
common man on his environment, on the kind of governance he has, on his
basic needs being met, on his rights being protected.
These are all political matters, not one of them is a military matter. So it
is a fallacy if anyone thinks anywhere that by sending it military you bring
in peace.
The military can only create a condition for the political actions to take
place. It can neither take political action, nor take on the role of the
political system.
So did you complete your task? The popular perception is that you did not.
If the IPKF was deemed a political weapon, obviously [it did not]. If it was
deemed a military weapon, the task was completed the day election was held
and the government could be installed. Thereafter there were no dispensation
that the IPKF could give out. We could not give them independence, we could
not give them devolution of powers, we could not give financial control to
the chief minister, we could not give the provincial government what it took
them to be a strong credible government.
I agree that we could not prevent the Sri Lankan government from arming the
LTTE. But I could have done it, I had the strength to do it. That would have
meant to forcibly preventing the Sri Lankan government from arming the LTTE.
You could have done that?
You know what that means. That means, taking over the country.
Did you think of taking over Sri Lanka any time?
No, no. Because we cannot be involved in it. It was not me, in fact nobody
in India could have done that to force the Sri Lankan government not to [arm
the LTTE]. Because what do you do with the Sri Lankan government still doing
it? What do you do? You go to war.
The
humiliation wasn't in Lanka. It was when the IPKF returned
So you came to a highly volatile disagreement with the Lankan government.
You had other confrontations too?
Well, there were differences, but they were not aired in public. The aim was
not to further murky the waters whereas our relationship,
country-to-country, was concerned. We had gone there to cement it, not to
destroy it. Differences were there all along. Strong ones. But they were not
aired in public. I took it up with the government there, I made my stand
clear to them. But thereafter there is nothing you can do.
If the intent of a government is not to go along with the agreement, you
can't force another country to do it.
Did someone in Delhi suggest that you force it on Lanka?
No. Use of military force against the government was never envisaged and
would have been totally wrong.
Not even during meetings in Delhi?
These issues were not discussed. They should not be certainly discussed at
public levels. The fact of the matter is that the Sri Lankan government was
welting their commitment. The only time when there was an open confrontation
between me and the government was when President Premadasa ordered the IPKF
confined to its lines. He gave this order sometime in December 1989. Then he
announced in a press statement that the IPKF has been ordered to stay in its
lines, if they do not comply they would be ordered an army of occupation.
And that we will then take action whatever it is.
It was told to me. That was a time when my forces were spread out all over
north and east of Sri Lanka. This was not a legitimate order as far as I was
concerned. I had to respond to it. It came at a crucial time, I think the
election had just been held in India. So one could not expect the Delhi
government to respond to the Sri Lankan government. It had to be played at
my level, because I was the commander of the forces there under the Accord.
And technically speaking I was accountable not just to one person but to the
Accord where there were two signatories, the prime minister of India and
prime minister of Sri Lanka.
So I was told this. In fact, a letter was prepared, signed by Premadasa,
very legalistic, all "herein after" and "therein after", "whomsoever" etc,
saying if you do not do this you will be declared ABCD. I was called up from
Colombo, asked that a special messenger, a brigadier, was coming carrying
the letter from the president of Sri Lanka, could you accept it? I said, Of
course I would accept it. Will you be there? I was flying out, there was
some operations on. I said if it is coming, I would make sure I was there to
receive them.
I, of course, had got to know the contents of the letter from various
sources. Plus, the BBC had also got to know of what had happened, this
ultimatum being given to me. They wanted to how I would respond to it. I did
not want things to come to a head-on. On the other hand I was not going to
risk the lives of my soldiers. Thirdly, this was a very unilateral action by
one party to the Accord. It was against the Accord.
So when the ultimatum was conveyed to me, I conveyed back that as per the
Accord, the North-Eastern province is under the IPKF. I am responsible here
for the safety of the entire region and if there was militant activity by
anyone, any force I would respond. And that if my forces are attacked by
anyone I would respond. That is as far as you can go, but it conveyed the
meaning of what it meant.
What was their response?
They backed out. I was told that the order will be given to the Sri Lankan
forces to throw us out. See, that is part of it. Then I explained that any
such action takes place, it could have 'unpredictable consequences.' For
which the responsibility would lie entirely with Sri Lanka. To make sure, I
conveyed to the press the same.
What was your assessment as the commander about the completion of the task?
My assessment was simple. In case the Sri Lankan government does not give
devolution, then nothing better will have happened. If they give devolution,
then my staying on would have some meaning. Then one could assist the
provincial government in being more effective. To make the Sri Lankan
government to give devolution would have needed pressure from the Government
of India.
And that was not happening?
It was the other way [round]. That we had to get out. The [Indian] election
had taken place, the decision was there, and Premadasa was reading the
manifesto better than me, because he was watching what was happening in
India. The Sri Lankan government and their policy were very much influenced
by the changes in the Indian politics at that time. Therefore they were very
observant of nuances of any position taken by any party [in India]. V P
Singh had already said he was against it. So once V P Singh was elected,
Premadasa knew the IPKF's days were numbered. All that he had to do was make
sure that he could delay the devolution till the IPKF was gone.
So the IPKF did not come back to India as a victorious force.
Yes. There was some feeling in my soldiers. The humiliation was not in Sri
Lanka, because there was no humiliation. The humiliation came when we came
back to India. The question people asked was, Why did we go there, what were
you doing there? When you send soldiers to such an area, you don't ask them
these questions, you don't ask them what were you doing there. Those are
things that you should have sorted out earlier.
Questions came from within the army?
No, never. But when the public started saying this, and the soldier starts
hearing it, he gets hurt. And the main thing was the so-called boycott of
IPKF soldiers when they arrived at Madras port. I think that was a needless
act. It was no good. I think the DMK was [then in power in Tamil Nadu] the
one, they boycotted it. The government in India did the right thing, they
said if they will not participate in the welcome, fine, we will send our
people from here.
So the defence minister that time, Raja Ramanna, came from Delhi and others
came from Delhi. Governor of the state Dr [P C] Alexander was there. But
that leaves a bad taste. It could have been avoided because it was not
conveying anything to me.
How did your appointment come through as the IPKF commander?
I was in Delhi only on leave. I had been earlier to UK doing a fellowship at
the IISS [International Institute of Strategic Studies]. It was a one-year
fellowship, it was 11 months when I was asked to cut it short, the army
wanted me in Southern Command. This was in the month of September-October
1987. I would have finished in November. I initially came, that time [Major]
General Harkirat Singh was the divisional commander in Jaffna.
My first encounter was that we had a setback in Jaffna, when the Sikh Light
Infantry carried out a helicopter attack [on Jaffna university] and it was
foiled. Our troops could not get there, they were held up all over Jaffna, 3
or 5 km outside. All the troops came under fire, they couldn't move. The
whole division was pinned down. That time they asked me to go into Jaffna to
direct operations for a short while. So I flew in, I was there for 10 days.
In fact, when I flew in I did not even have spare clothing, I had only the
normal uniform you wear. The aircraft was flown into Madras, an Indian
Airlines plane was charted there.
It was your first journey to Sri Lanka?
I had visited it once before. Two months before, to see what was happening.
That time fighting wasn't there, just there to see what was happening. I was
in Southern Command. A one-day trip. I had never been to Sri Lanka before,
and in one-day you cannot see much.
I went in there. We had to make a plan. General Sunderji flew in there the
next day with the GoC-in-C, Southern Command. I told them what was to be
done. It was imperative that Jaffna be captured. I mean, I discovered that
it was a national imperative because our prime minister was going to
Vancouver and then from there to Washington to meet the US president. The
fact that the fourth largest army in the world couldn't get to a town like
this would have been talked about.
So there were too many imperatives. Jaffna had to be captured, particularly
as the US Congress had passed a resolution welcoming the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord. I had made a plan and changed the earlier plan, modified the earlier
plan, and we tried out double envelopment. Instead of taking Jaffna
frontally, that is north to south, I planned to make a feint, give the LTTE
and other occupied forces a surprise. Move two groups, one from the right
and one from the left. Do an encircle from behind and get into Jaffna from
the rear.
We did that. We surprised them because we outflanked them from both sides
and landed at their base in Jaffna on the southern side. That was very close
to the Jaffna fort. Inside the fort was the Sri Lankan army. They were not
able to move. From there I moved in more troops and from the rear we
attacked.
In the first attack on Jaffna there were too many casualties. Who is to be
blamed?
I as a professional soldier do not comment on another general. If I were
removed from the scene, I could comment on some other operation elsewhere,
but this one becomes one's subject, so I would not comment. I am prepared to
say what one did, but would not like to pass judgement on what someone did
when I was not there.
But it was avoidable?
Well, it was the man's decision that time. Depends on what inputs he had.
What perception he had. And based on that he took a decision. Honestly, that
decision must have been discussed with the superiors. Superiors are always
watching. So I don't know what all inputs went into his decision... of
course, he was the final authority.
Didn't Delhi push more troops into the furnace?
Out of the 1,200 killed, in the next two years when I was in command only
six hundred were killed. Six hundred or so died in the first few months.
What failed in Jaffna?
The operation was planned to capture Jaffna. And it didn't work. Basically I
felt attacking it frontally perhaps is wrong. But then it also has to be
based on what were the perceptions and inputs available: Will the LTTE
fight, how capable they were. In fact, it was the first time that head-on
attack took place. The perception and intelligence build-up was that they
would not fight the IPKF. And we felt it [frontal attack] was the right
thing to do. If there were any possibility of attack, it would not have been
done.
All along your intelligence agencies told you that the LTTE would not fight
you?
I don't know. I wasn't there. When I was there, I firmly believe battlefield
intelligence had to be collected by my soldiers. The intelligence of RAW and
other agencies is good at political or strategic level.
But when the soldiers went in, they had no idea at all about the LTTE and
others?
Absolutely. There is no doubt the force went in unprepared. Not only that,
the equipment that the army had then, compared to even some of the other
Asian countries, was prehistoric. Infantry soldiers particularly: the kind
of radio sets, rifle, machine gun. I mean they were out of date.
Even there were no maps. What they had was printed a 100 years ago. Reprints
were done. It was at a scale when you fly over you can see an area, but you
cannot make out any roads or any marks. It was almost six months after I had
taken over that we could get some maps. Almost nine months after the IPKF
landed there. Unfortunate.
And then, you are operating in an area where you don't know the language.
Tamil is the language that is spoken there. In our army, except for the
Madras regiment, no other regiment speaks Tamil. You had gone there to help
people, and if you cannot speak their language how are you going to help
them? You can't help them with sign language. How do you except them to come
and co-operate with you? These need preparation.
One thing is certain, it was a totally unprepared and ill-equipped force
that landed there. If the role was only to show your overbearing presence,
and make sure that they amicably handed over their weapons, it was fine. But
if the role involved peace enforcement, then it was totally unprepared and
ill-equipped.
Why did General Sunderji agree with the political establishment to rush in
troops?
One does not know what were the inputs General Sunderji got. By the time I
was there, we were at firing range with each other. It was open hostility.
It was in the previous six months all this happened. Someone will have to
write who played a role in Delhi, and I am not the person. To begin with I
was across the seas, and after we captured Jaffna I came back.
After the Jaffna take-over you came back. Why did you go back permanently?
I was on leave in Delhi. On 31st of December, New Year's eve, I got a
message, Please be at the operations room on January 1. There they told me
that a decision has been taken to put me in charge as the chief of IPKF.
Technically, I came in command in the first week of January in 1998.
There are reports that India's diplomatic mission in Lanka and the IPKF
differed on most issues. Was that true?
I know there were disagreements taking place when I went in. But I feel when
we are abroad for this kind of role neither of us can have private agendas.
It has to be one agenda, that is the national agenda. I was clear on that, I
spoke to the high commissioner. We never had a problem for the two years.
Our interaction was regular.
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